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JUDGE ROBERT H. Bork’s champions are marketing him for the U.S. Supreme Court as a strict constructionist who gives
the utmost deference to congressional intent in his legal analysis. President Reagan described him as a fair-minded jurist
who believes his role is to interpret the law, not make it. Judge Bork is touted as a believer in judicial restraint who will
help end the process by which judges become non-elected legislatures through their failure to adhere accurately and
narrowly to the legislative commands.
A careful examination of Judge Bork’s writings demonstrates that this description is not accurate. The judge’s
interpretations of congressional intent in his original area of specialization demonstrate that he is a judicial activist for his
ideological causes. Contrary to his protestations and those of his champions, Judge Bork interprets congressional will
selectively to suit his own agenda; he does not defer to a Congress that had different goals. Not only does he consider his
interpretation of original intent the only correct one; he denounces as unconstitutional any conclusions to the contrary.
Judge Bork, now a member of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, made his early reputation
as an antitrust scholar. He first attracted attention during the 1960s through several important articles, all brilliantly written,
that argued there was too much antitrust enforcement. He expanded and synthesized his analysis into an enormously
influential 1978 book, The Antitrust Paradox. Key to his arguments was his then-novel conclusion that the only legitimate
goal of the antitrust laws was to enhance the efficiency of our economy. This conclusion was in many ways the foundation
of his attack on antitrust. As Judge Bork correctly noted, Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are to give a
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law -- what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer
we give.1
THE VIEW OF the goals of the antitrust laws that prevailed almost universally until less than a generation ago was
decidedly populist. Various social and political goals were deemed important to the antitrust laws’ framers.2 This view held
center stage virtually until the advent of the Reagan administration.3
There is today a consensus, even among liberal scholars, that Warren court antitrust decisions, built upon a heavily social
and political view of the goals of antitrust, were far too interventionist. In addition to overly strict substantive standards,
the excesses included the practical problems that inevitably arose in the implementation of a relatively amorphous
social/political orientation. These implementation problems helped make the antitrust world receptive to a more
conservative alternative that promised superior implementation, clarity and predictability.
If a single scholarly work were to be given credit for providing the basis for the efficiency-oriented view of antitrust it
surely would be the seminal 1966 article by then-Professor Bork,4 the foundation for his 1978 masterwork. It also formed
the basis for the conclusions of countless other conservative scholars.5
Judge Bork asserted that his analysis was a strict constructionist view of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. In a
lengthy, heavily footnoted text, he developed the argument that the original framers of the Sherman Act had a single intent:
to enhance economic efficiency. Judge Bork argued that [t]he whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss
in consumer welfare.6
Judge Bork further asserted that there was not a scintilla of support in the act’s legislative history for broad social, political
and ethical mandates.7 He explicitly denied that wealth transferred or extracted from consumers to firms with market power
could have been a possible congressional concern: [I]t seems clear the income distribution effects of economic activity
should be completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity, he wrote.8
Judge Bork developed his argument through a detailed analysis of the 1890 legislative record. He pointed to dozens of
statements that revealed an overriding congressional concern that the trusts would acquire monopoly (or market) power that
would give them the ability to raise prices and restrict output artificially.9 Judge Bork presents a convincing case that this
concern preoccupied Congress during the debates. He then uses modern economic analysis to explain how monopoly power
leading to higher prices for consumers can produce a form of economic inefficiency termed allocative inefficiency, which
is a reduction of the total wealth of society. The explanation of why this happens is complex.10)
Judge Bork reasoned that because we now know the only harm to consumer welfare from higher prices is economic
inefficiency, congressional displeasure with market power can be equated fairly with a concern for economic efficiency.
Judge Bork then quotes far fewer, although still significant, remarks that manifest a congressional desire to preserve and
enhance corporate productive efficiency.11 On the basis of this evidence, he concludes that the antitrust laws embody only
a concern for consumer welfare, a term of art he defines as the aggregate economic efficiency of our economy.12
The entire Chicago school quickly adopted Judge Bork’s conclusion that economic efficiency should be the sole value
weighed in antitrust analysis.13President Reagan’s appointments to head the antitrust enforcement agencies naturally also
adopted and implemented this standard.14
NOTICE THE subtle, yet crucial, change in terminology. Judge Bork uses consumer welfare as an Orwellian term of art
that has little or nothing to do with the welfare of consumers. His desire to maximize consumer welfare (which he defined
as economic efficiency) carries with it no concern about the wealth extracted from consumers by firms with market power
as a result of the higher prices that arise from cartel or other prohibited behavior.
Judge Bork thus defines consumers to include monopolists and cartels. Antitrust based on Judge Bork’s definition of
consumer welfare makes no distinction between real consumers -- the purchasers of goods and services -- and the firms
with market power that raise prices and thereby extract wealth from purchasers. Higher prices to consumers are fine with
Judge Bork as long as the monopolist or the cartel produces efficiently.
Judge Bork correctly noted that the Sherman Act’s legislative history is replete with concern over the higher prices
consumers face as a result of monopoly pricing. But he is mistaken in his belief that Congress understood this concern to
mean a desire to avoid economic inefficiency. None of the quotations presented by Judge Bork suggests Congress was even
aware that monopoly prices lead to economic inefficiency. Even leading economists of the day had only a tenuous
understanding of this concept15 and, as conservative Nobel laureate George J. Stigler reminds us, no economist had any
significant effect on the Sherman Act’s passage.16 Not surprisingly, Judge Bork’s hundreds of citations to the 1890 debates
fail to contain evidence that even a single member of Congress knew monopoly pricing is inefficient. Put simply, Congress
did not condemn the trusts for their lack of efficiency.
Congress was, however, well aware that higher prices from monopoly power transfer wealth from consumers to firms with
market power. Indeed, the debates strongly suggest that Congress condemned the trusts and monopolies for exactly this
reason. For example, Senator Sherman termed monopolistic overcharges extortion which makes the people poor, and
extorted wealth.17 Congressman Coke referred to the overcharges as robbery.18 Representative Heard declared that the
trusts, without rendering the slightest equivalent, have stolen untold millions from the people.19 Congressman Wilson
complained that one particular trust robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.20 Representative Fithian
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declared that the trusts were impoverishing the people through robbery.21 Senator Hoar declared that monopolistic pricing
was a transaction the direct purpose of which is to extort from the community...wealth which ought to be generally diffused
over the whole community.22 Senator George complained: They aggregate to themselves great enormous wealth by
extortion which makes the people poor.23
These value-laden condemnations of the wealth-extraction effects of monopoly pricing show a much broader concern than
with mere economic efficiency. A fair reading of the Sherman Act’s legislative history reveals that it is in large part a
consumer protection statute. Congress’ primary reason for passing the antitrust laws was to prevent consumers from paying
more than the competitive level for their goods and services. Judge Bork tried to make the stockholders of monopolies and
cartels into honorary consumers; but the consumers that Congress wanted to protect comprised only purchasers of goods
and services.
DESPITE THE common sense that truly underlay congressional intent, it is not difficult to understand how Judge Bork’s
story gained such widespread acceptance.
Perhaps the most important reason was his clever but deceptive selection of his key term, consumer welfare, as the lodestar
of antitrust.24 Few people realize how counterintuitively he defined the term. He succeeded in promoting his interpretation
because the subject is extremely complex; other than economists and some antitrust lawyers, few understand that monopoly
prices lead to both allocative inefficiency and a transfer of wealth from consumers to the monopolist. As Judge Bork
translated legislative intent into triangles and rectangles and then back to the appealing term consumer welfare, few
discovered what he had really done. Even the Supreme Court appears to have been confused.25
In addition, Judge Bork’s argument that only an efficiency approach to antitrust is clear and predictable for businesses also
has won many converts. Even many who strongly suspect that Congress may have intended the antitrust laws to encompass
more than economic efficiency have to admit that the social-and-political school of antitrust was extremely difficult to
administer.26 Judge Bork recently has taken his assertion of superior administrability much further; he has argued that
courts cannot include values other than economic efficiency in antitrust analysis without engaging in a task that is so
unconfinedly legislative as to be unconstitutional.27
But Judge Bork’s approach is, at best, no easier to administer and no more clear or predictable than a price to consumers
(or wealth-transfer) approach. Under both, the required quantities -- a prediction of market power and efficiencies -- are
identical.28
Consider two differences that would arise if a new set of federal antitrust enforcers attempted to use an unconstitutional
antitrust law to prevent consumers from being forced to pay monopoly prices.29 Both would lead to significantly more
aggressive antitrust enforcement. The major change from the existing approach to merger enforcement would be the
undramatic lowering of the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines’ numerical threshold levels.30 Since the wealth-transfer
approach would factor in not only the inefficiencies resulting from higher prices but also the extraction of wealth from
consumers, the anti-merger rules that would emerge would be tougher.
More dramatically, consider a merger that produced an efficient monopolist that would raise prices significantly. Judge
Bork would ask only whether the merger produced more efficiencies than inefficiencies. If so, he would approve the merger
despite the fact that all of the efficiency savings from the merger would accrue to the monopolist while consumers would
have to pay significantly higher prices for fewer goods.31 By contrast, an unconstitutional merger policy truly based upon
congressional intent would block such mergers.
A wealth transfer or price to consumer approach to merger enforcement would ask a different question: Is the merger likely
to lead to significantly higher prices for consumers? If the answer is yes the merger would be blocked, with full knowledge
that so doing would prevent the formation of an efficient monopoly. This is because Congress cared more about protecting
consumers from monopoly extortion than obtaining the benefits of allowing efficient monopolies.
DOES IT REALLY matter that Judge Bork was so wrong about congressional intent? That he read so many pages of the
legislative record and did not find any of the evidence contrary to his preferred views? That he equated the welfare of
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purchasers with the welfare of cartels? That he defined consumer welfare in a way that permits consumers to pay higher
prices to monopolists, and stated that views challenging his own are unconstitutional?
It does, for two reasons. The less important is that his incorrect views of the congressional intent behind the antitrust laws
leads to many incorrect antitrust policy conclusions and judicial decisions.32
More important, Judge Bork’s antitrust record portends that as a Supreme Court justice he is unlikely to be a true strict
constructionist. Moderates and liberals may have little to fear from a true strict constructionist since such a justice would
impartially implement Congress’ original intent. Judge Bork, however, saves his narrow view of a judge’s role for
instances when this posture is consistent with his preferred ends. In other cases, he finds a way to reach the result demanded
by his ideology and denounces contrary conclusions as unconstitutional.
One can usefully debate the extent to which a Supreme Court justice should be a strict constructionist. However, both sides
in the confirmation battle should know whether a candidate’s record is consistent with strict constructionism or with
judicial activism. Judge Bork’s antitrust record indicates he is likely to be a judicial activist for his conservative agenda,
and not a consistent strict constructionist.
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